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Rebuilding a Natio
Myths, Realities, and Solutions in
days of the British Empire after World War I. The mythmakers, who are universal y non-Iraqi, as ert that nothing

catastrophic blundering, likely to result in an
exponential rise in the region's entropy, as US

policymakers and Iraqis ponder how to deal

historical or cultural binds Iraq's people together. Rather,

A with policymakers failure exponential catastrophiwicttheh thetoviovilenceolencewhicunders
h has engultanfdedriBasgehdabldu.ndering, and in which Iraqis the region's has Iraq's likely ponder engulfed entropy, to history how result Baghdad. to as in risks deal US an
Several pernicious myths have entered this debate and, having
become accepted "facts," cause real-world harm when they
influence the thinking of foreign policymakers. The myths,
which as ume a lack of national Iraqi identity, artificiality of
the state, continuous sectarian fighting throughout history,

Kurdish desire for independence, and Shi'a disloyalty, lead
some to the conclusion that dividing Iraq is the best way
to end the violence. Instead of building on these myths,
however, the international community should create a longterm solution by working with the emerging democratic Iraq

to recognize and develop its historic presence as a unified
nation. The future of the country is as a cohesive, democratic,

the inhabitants were forced to coexist by their British mas-

ters, who stitched together the three Ottoman provinces
of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul into a single state. This argument is not only unhistorical, but it also has a far more

destructive corollary that there is no point in attempting
to hold this historic anomaly together and that its natural
state should be one of division, defacto or de jure, among its

three components, Shi'a Arab, Sunni Arab, and Kurd. The
myth ignores that Iraq is actual y a nation with an ancient
identity that actively took part in international affairs and
modernization before the Saddamist Baathists took control.
This corollary courts disaster.
To begin with, Iraq has the oldest recorded history of any
country on Earth. The word "Iraq" itself is ancient, and prob-

and pluralistic federation. With that understanding in mind,

ably dates back to Akkadian times. When medieval Islamic

it wil be possible to devise a strategy that averts some of

geographers referred to "Iraq," they meant roughly the same
place we mean now. Over the 500 years it was ruled by the
Ottomans, the other two provinces were not independent of

the darker possible scenarios and helps return Iraq and the
region to stability.

The Myth of Artificiality
The first of these myths is that Iraq is an artificial state,
created in an exercise of imperial hubris during the waning

Baghdad, but were administratively subordinate to it. Thus,
over a span of centuries - if not millennia - the people of Iraq
have been one, for all their ethnic and confessional differences. Ancient history notwithstanding, Iraq has now been
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a modern state for four score and seven years. Since 1920,
a distinct Iraqi identity has emerged, one distinct from and
layered over tribal, ethnic, and sectarian affiliations.
The process of forging an Iraqi national identity mani-

the dissolution of Iraq is not on the agenda. Another way of
reaching out to Iraqi nationalists involves the constitutional

fested itself in the country's actions on the international

was brokered immediately prior to the referendum on the
permanent constitution, which had garnered opposition and

stage. Iraq was the first predominately Arab country to gain

process, a method which is often largely ignored by the
international community. In October 2005, an agreement

its independence when it was admitted into the League of

rejection by both nationalist and Sunni parties. Under the

Nations in 1932. It was among the 54 countries that founded
the United Nations in 1945, and it was also a founder of both

the League of Arab States and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. This confidence and vibrancy

agreement's terms, the process of amending the constitution
would be re-opened during the first session of parliament.
This pact was appropriate, recalling that, because the Sunni
parties had boycotted the elections for the constitution-draft-

in international affairs mirrored a high degree of internal

ing Assembly, they then had minimal representation in the

optimism and cohesion.
Fueled by Iraq's increasing oil wealth, a burst of economic development beginning in the mid-1950s resulted

transitional period long enough to allow for full Sunni participation, even though the referendum has already approved

drafting process. In essence, the agreement extended the

in spectacular strides. By the end of 1979 - the last full year
before the disastrous war with Iran - Iraq was on the verge

of joining the developed world. Its per capita GDP equaled
that of Spain, which would enter the European Union six
years later. By then, Iraq had cash on reserve in hard cur-

rency reserves totaling US$50 billion (in 1980 terms). It is
difficult to imagine the heights Iraq might have reached,
domestically and internationally, had it been blessed with
more enlightened leadership over the next 23 years. Instead,
Saddam Hussein launched a series of wars which decimated
the country's population and economy.

Colin Powell asserted in 2002 US Congressional testimony that Iraq was a failed state. That is a hard case to
prove, given the gains it made from 1920 through 1979. It
would have been more accurate for Powell to have said that
after 1979, Iraq had a failed government. Saddam Hussein's

deliberate policy of maintaining control by playing violently on ethnic and confessional differences has led some
commentators to believe that such differences have always

resulted in violence in Iraq, even though a long history
argues otherwise.

Reconciliation with Insurgent Nationalists
Despite Saddam Hussein's policies, this national history
has fostered a true sense of national Iraqi identity that cannot be lightly dismissed. Indeed, as UN officials continually
assert, it has been clear for some time that a significant segment - it is difficult to quantify the percentage precisely - of
the current insurgency is now composed of Iraqi nationalists
fighting against what they perceive as a potential break-up
Opposite: Iraqi police forces in Najaf celebrate the successful
of the country by outside forces. These nationalists are inconstitutional referendum. Above: An Iraqi boy burns a bank
dividuals who, though suspicious of the United States, were note featuring former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

relieved by the removal of the previous regime. Decisions
made along the way, such as the dissolution of the army the permanent constitution. As things turned out, a swing of

73,000 votes in Nineveh Governorate, just two-thirds of one
percent of the total vote, would have defeated the constituindividuals and groups to violence.
The United Nations is a logical intermediary in the tion. Had this last-minute agreement not occurred, it is likely
efforts of the Iraqi government to reach out and provide that the constitution would have been defeated.
both nonviolent avenues for discussion and reassurance that
Proceeding with the constitutional amendment proand overly aggressive de-Baathification, have pushed these
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contemplating
another such amnesty in May 2006, the US
cess would not only honor a promise, but would
also allow
decried
for addressing substantive deficits in the Congress
document.
Oneamnesty for those who had killed US
citizens. to
Yetthe
if amnesty was not for those who had been
gaping lacuna in the permanent constitution relates
involved in insurgent
acts, for whose benefit was it? For
ambiguities respecting the ownership, management,
and
reconciliation
to have meaning, it has to include some undistribution of Iraq's oil. This issue is perceived
by many
savory characters,
insurgent nationalists as fundamental to the future
unity andincluding some who have shed the blood
of Iraqis
and US citizens. That, after all, is the experience of
stability of the country, and thus the ambiguities
constitute
other countries in similar circumstances. The Germans, for
a major irritant.
had to reverse an overly rigorous de-Nazification
Regardless of any eventual substantiveinstance,
resolution,

order
however, re-opening the amendment process process
allows in
for
fullto maintain national cohesion and rebuild
a functioning
state.
acceptance of the process of constitution-drafting,
which,
Thereoccur
are other
by virtue of the Sunni parties' boycott, did not
in avenues of cooperation with insurgent

nationalists.
These nationalists are unlikely to be sanguine
2005. Though there is broad agreement within
Iraq's polity
at democratic,
the targeting of large numbers of Iraqi civilians by Al
that the future of the country is as a unified,
Qaeda and the
Saddamist Baathists; they may even join
and pluralistic federation, there is not yet a consensus
as to
in the fight
what federalism means in the Iraqi context. Engaging
inagainst
the such organizations if they are induced
the political process. Thus, political dialogue with
review process would allow for discussion by to
alljoin
parliamen-

insurgent
nationalists and their inclusion in a reconciliatary parties on these and other issues, thereby
increasing
tion the
process
that aims toward a unified Iraq will have the
confidence-building measures among not only
parties,
additional and necessary benefit of isolating both AI Qaeda
but their respective constituents as well.
the Saddamists.
Any political solution would, of course, and
include
a recQaeda nor the Saddamists have a negotiable
onciliation process. Here the Iraqis must have Neither
a free AI
hand
political
to deal with their compatriots, which they have
not agenda.
had inThey possess instead a nihilistic desire to
the political
the recent past. In 2004, when then-Primedestroy
Minister
Iyad process which has been under way for
the the
past three
years. AI Qaeda and its allies in Iraq endeavor
Allawi announced amnesty for those outside
political
to establish
a Taliban-style Islamic emirate and to defeat the
process, the US embassy in Baghdad immediately
declared
United States
that such a policy would not be available to anyone
who and
hadits allies not only in Iraq, but throughout
the world.
The Saddamists wish to return Iraq to the era
spilt American blood. This statement, in turn,
led Prime
absolute
rule by the Baath Party. Like AI Qaeda, they
Minister Allawi to say that amnesty would notofapply
to those
therefore thoroughly reject the political process. Neither
who had killed Iraqis.
While current Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki was
group is interested in political dialogue, much less compro-
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mise. These two groups can only be dealt with militarily, a
process which would be greatly facilitated through isolating
them from the nationalists by reassuring the latter of Iraq's
continued unity as a federated state and engaging them in

the reconciliation and political processes.

Confronting Death Squads , Not Civilian Hatred
An oft-repeated myth was recendy articulated on CNN's

"Late Edition" by US Senator Gordon Smith. Smith, reassuring the viewer that he was an avid student of history,
informed Wolf Blitzer that the Shi'as and Sunnis of Iraq have
been "butchering each other for four times longer than we

have been a nation." There have been, unfortunately, too
many instances in Iraq's past when the central government
in Baghdad has targeted one or another group for violence:

The most immediate threat confronting Iraqis is the
existence of these death squads that roam, with substantial

impunity, throughout the capital. As in other contexts in
the Middle East, a small minority of extremists, despite a
dearth of popular support, are nonetheless able to subject
the majority to its will. Baghdad's beleaguered population
has suffered unspeakable horrors. Because the government
has not yet demonstrated the ability to protect the population, Baghdadis are understandably tempted to hide behind
militias that do offer some form of protection. But to date,
despite that temptation, these sectarian death squads have not
demonstrated the ability to actually rally Baghdad's civilian
populations to their sides.
Disarming these death squads and promoting the capacity of the government to protect its citizens will restore the

"THE LONG HISTORY OF AMITY AMONG

IRAQ'S PEOPLE AUGURS WELL

FORTHEIR ABILITY TO OVERCOME
CURRENT SECTARIAN TENSIONS."
the Assyrians in 1933, the Kurds in 1987 and 1988, and the

Marsh Arabs in 1991. Yet, with the possible exception of
the mistreatment of Baghdad's Jews in 1941, there has not
been a single instance of civilian, neighbor-versus-neighbor,

ethno-confessional violence in Iraq's modern history. For
example, there is no instance of the Kurds of a village rising
to massacre the Arabs, or vice versa.

Even now, the overwhelming majority of Baghdad's
population is caught in the midst of violence, yet desires
nothing more than peace and the opportunity to rebuild the
country. Death squads drive this violence, which represents
the first sectarian violence in Iraqi history. Though much has
happened since then, an illustration from 2003 demonstrates

where the hearts of Baghdadis lie: as the previous regime
collapsed, a mob of ruffians approached the neighborhood
in which Baghdad's last remaining Jewish families lived.
Realizing what was likely about to happen, the neighborhood's Muslim residents formed a cordon, challenging the
approaching mob and successfully protecting their Jewish

neighbors. The long history of amity among Iraq's people

trans-confessional harmony which has been the natural state
of Iraq throughout its history. The government of Iraq has

announced its commitment to accomplishing this goal. To
that end, the planned surge of Multinational Forces (MNF)
in Baghdad is a salutary development, as, of course, is the
planned concomitant acceleration of the training of Iraq's
own security forces. The goal must not be merely to enhance
the role of the MNF. In the long term, Iraqi forces must be
sufficiently trained, strengthened, and equipped to be able to
provide security on their own. In addition to further training
and better equipment, these forces must be purged of the
unofficial militia elements which have infiltrated them. This

process has also begun thorough screening and re-training of
specific units. As militias are disarmed, Iraq's nascent security
forces will have to earn the trust of Baghdad's population,
street by street and neighborhood by neighborhood.

The Myth of Kurdish Separatism
Another perpetuated myth is that the Kurds of Iraq seek
independence. The Kurdish leadership certainly understands

that the Kurds will have much greater stability within a

augurs well for their ability to overcome current sectarian

tensions.

Not even this sectarian violence, occurring principally
in Baghdad, is neighbor-versus-neighbor. Rather, it is largely
the result of a deliberate policy by AI Qaeda to ignite a civil
war. It is also the work of organized death squads, some of

united Iraq rather than as part of a fragmented country. The
leadership understands that it may now occupy the ideal position: autonomy in northern Iraq with a hand on the levers

of power in Baghdad, all protected by an internationally

recognized border. Nor is this concept of autonomy new to
which have leaderships with one foot in the government Iraqi politics: the term autonomy in the context of Kurdistan
and one outside. These death squads are not fighting each has been in the Iraqi lexicon since the 1960s, when it was first
other, with the exception of negligible skirmishes. Instead, promised. The difference now is that the promise to Iraq's
they are targeting civilians.
Kurds is not purely rhetorical. Their rights are no longer
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merely enshrined on paper, but are being respected on the

conscripts, first and foremost, was with their country. Just

ground. It is no small occurrence that Masoud Barazani,

as Iraq's Shi'a population thought of itself as Iraqi, Iran's
ethnic Arab population in Khuzistan province regarded

president of the Kurdistan Regionàl Government, stated in
the ceremony announcing the interim constitution that, for
the first time in his life, he was proud to be an Iraqi. Kurdish
linguistic and political rights, which were already protected
in the interim constitution, were preserved and augmented
in the permanent constitution.
Given the barbarous treatment of ethnic Kurds throughout the 3 5 -year Baathist reign of horror, including nearly 1 5
years of separation enforced by US and Allied jets, it is not
surprising that many rank-and-file Iraqi Kurds are indeed
skeptical of Iraq as a state. It may take time, but after the
process of political, economic, and social re-integration has
taken its course, it is easily predictable that the ardor for
independence that they possess will cool. There is reason to
believe that this process has already begun, as demonstrated
by the overwhelming support in Iraqi Kurdistan regarding
the referendum for a permanent constitution - a document
that preserves Kurdish rights within a united, federated Iraq.
Moreover, it should not be assumed in the first place that all
Kurdish rank-and-file desire separation. The results of both

the January and December 2005 elections suggest there is
little appetite for secession amongst the Kurds of Baghdad,
the city with the single largest Kurdish
population in the country.

itself as Iranian, fighting the Iraqi army with ferocity. This
otherwise pointless war proved one thing: the Middle East's
post- World War I state system was ingrained in the minds
of the peoples of the region, and those who would tamper
with it do so at their own peril.

The Implications of a Divided Iraq
Notwithstanding the lesson so brutally learned in the
Iran-Iraq war and the many other realities on the ground,
there are those - principally US citizens and elected officials - who advocate Iraq's division. They harken back
nearly a century to the myth of colonial creation. Indeed,
they are themselves prepared to commit the same sin which
they accuse the British of having committed: engaging in a
neo-colonialist impulse to dispose of what is not theirs and
tampering with what have been stable international borders-despite Saddam's repeated attempts to ram them - for
nearly a century. This is a Sykes-Picot Agreement for the new

century. Whatever else is happening there today, no Iraqi is
fighting to secure the division of the country.
Some go further, advocating the stationing of US troops

The Myth ofShVa Disloyalty
The last myth informing much

of the debate in Western and other

capitals is that Iraq's Shi'a population
anxiously awaits the first opportunity to unite with Iran. Among others,

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
has publicly voiced such views. Inher-

ent in the myth is that Iraq's Shi'a
population is of Iranian descent, even
though the vast majority of Iraq's Shi'a
are descended from Arab tribes who
converted to Shi'ism in the last two

hundred years or so.
But there could be no more definitive repudiation of this myth than

the eight years of brutal fighting in
the Iran-Iraq war. A quarter-million
Iraqis died in that conflict. Since the
Iraqi conscript army was composed

predominately of Shi'as, the Shi'a
population took the brunt of the casualties. Iraq's Shi'as fought and died
for Iraq, in contrast to 1991 and 2003,

Kurdish women carry posters in support of Iraqi President JalalTalabani in Sulaima-

when the army refused to fight for nia, northeast of Baghdad.After spending two weeks in a Jordanian hospital, Talabani
Saddam against the United States and returned to Iraq to the cheers of thousands of Kurds.The question of a permanent

its allies. The identification of the Shi'a Iraqi constitution has been met with great support in Iraqi Kurdistan.
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in Iraqi Kurdistan to effectuate the division. They fail, how-

ever, to consider the effect of doing so: the United States
would be rightly seen throughout the region and the larger
Islamic world as having forcibly divided Iraq at the point of
a gun - in effect "proving" that such division was the real
goal of the intervention from the beginning.
It is hard to overstate the negative effect this perception
would have on US standing throughout the Islamic world in
the long term, as it would immeasurably bolster recruitment
into the ranks of militant Islam. In that sense, former US Am-

to what they had hoped would be limited chaos they could
control, the threatened disintegration of Iraq is not in their
collective or individual self-interests, unleashing, as it will,
competitive forces between them that will be impossible to
control. It has thus become clear that a political solution to

Iraq's problems must include dialogue with each of its six
contiguous neighbors, as well as with other powers. Such
dialogue would serve to reassure countries that a stable,
democratic Iraq will pose no threat to their interests. Iraq's
neighbors must, in turn, abide by their obligations under the

"RIPPING APART A COUNTRY IN THE HEART OF
THE ARAB AND ISLAMIC WORLDS...WOULD MAKE
THE LAST 60 YEARS OF MIDDLE EAST HISTORY

LOOK LIKE PEACE AND TRANQUILITY ITSELF."
bassador John Bolton's recent assertion that Iraq's territorial
integrity is not part of US "strategic interest" is myopic.

2005 UN Security Council Resolution 1618, which called
upon regional countries to refrain from providing assistance

Advocates of division also fail to fully comprehend

of any type to those individuals or organizations who are

implications within the region. An independent Kurdistan,
even if it were independent in all but name, would be viewed
as an existential threat in three capitals: Damascus, Ankara,

committing acts of violence in Iraq. Iraq's continued engage-

ment with regional powers will help engender stability in
Iraq and the larger region.

and Tehran. Each of those capitals' countries has a larger
Kurdish population than does Iraq. As such, they would have
a vested interest in creating instability for this landlocked
mini-entity, fearing, as each does, Kurdish separatism within
their own states.

Furthermore, division would not result in three neat
entities. The southern region could easily fracture into two
to four zones, each ruled by its own warlord. This scenario

would have worse implications for the large Shi'a populations in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf States.
West-central Iraq, in the meantime, would likely fracture
into at least two zones of its own, one ruled by former regime

loyalists, the other becoming a Taliban-style emirate on the
border with Jordan. All this says nothing of the devastating
human tragedy that would unfold with massive population
shifts, as Iraq's highly integrated populations move into differing ethno-sectarian zones.

Nor should the centripetal effect of a unified Iraq be
lightly dismissed where the Kurds are concerned. They
were unable to form a cohesive government during their 12
years of enforced separation from Baghdad until Iraq was put

back together in 2005, and they fought a bloody civil war

Undertaking concrete steps in conjunction with various
parties is the only hope of creating an internal and regional

environment capable of bringing about a solution to the
violence which now grips Iraq. Recalling the country's own
history of inter-communal harmony and cohesion, the steps

must begin by expanding the political process, reopening
constitutional negotiations on critical issues, and starting a

serious reconciliation process, thereby isolating AI Qaeda
and the Saddamists. The political process in Iraq must additionally engage Iraq's neighbors. In the meantime, the
temporary surge of US troops must go toward disarming
militias in Baghdad. Ultimately, any approach to Iraq's
problems must not be merely a short-sighted expediency,
but one which takes into account a strategic vision for the
region, one that promotes stability and isolates radicalism,
with the goal of definitively defeating it.
In the end, Iraqis will have to solve for themselves the
difficult political questions and make the complex compromises necessary to stabilize their own country. This process
of statecraft is not a matter of genetic memory, but rather

a learnt behavior - one whose lessons, after 35 years of

among themselves in the process. In short, ripping apart a
country in the heart of the Arab and Islamic worlds would

result in a degree of regional instability that would make

absolute tyranny, Iraq's political elite are learning under far
less than ideal circumstances. The international community

can help Iraqis reach, if not a consensus, at least a modus

the last 60 years of Middle East history look like peace and
tranquility itself.

Iraq's neighbors understand the catastrophic implica-

tions of this scenario. While some of them have contributed

Supporting Reconciliation and Stability

vivendi , by acting as a catalyst, promoting the process of
political reconciliation and generating regional support for
the stability and unity of Iraq. GO
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